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In an effort to recover quickly from the Asian crisis, the Securities and 
Exchange Law of Korea was revised in 1998 to require all publicly traded 
companies to appoint at least one outside director on their boards. Outside 
directorship had been totally unknown to Korean business before the crisis and 
thus provides an interesting opportunity to observe how business practices are 
transplanted to a new environment. Using data compiled from annual reports of 
Korean financial institutions in 1999-2000, this paper attempts to reveal the 
logic behind the outside director network that was being formed for the first 
time in Korea. The analysis finds that, although the legal requirement is being 
met, the real mechanism at work is cooptation by large financial institutions 
rather than the originally intended monitoring by outside directors. Unlike the 
American case where bank centrality has traditionally been predominant, it is 
not banks but universities with high legitimacy that are at the center of the 
network. Family ownership is poisonous because it lowers performance and shuts 
down the window to the outside world. The results seem to imply that 
transplanting an institutional practice to a new environment with different 
contexts can often lead to modifications that betray the original purpose.
Key Words: Korean business, outside director, interlocking director, bank 
centrality, cooptation, Asian crisis
INTRODUCTION
Crises dismantle the status quo. With its powerful disruptive forces, 
an economic crisis can open a leak through which institutional 
practices alien to the status quo might flow into the heart of the 
long-standing economic system. On the other hand, the new 
institutional practices thus introduced are often no longer the same as 
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they were in the original environment, because they are frequently 
modified to suit the new environment by the collective efforts of the 
affected parties in the latter. The Asian economic crisis of 1997/98 
provides an excellent opportunity to observe this process. Although 
the so-called “developmental state” system in Korea began to dissolve 
since the early 1980s, it was not until the Asian crisis that the country 
finally and painfully realized that it had no time left before making a 
dramatic change. The peculiarities of the Korean system once admired 
as the engine of fast-growth machine were suddenly criticized as 
cronyism, corruption, and bubble.
In an effort to go through the crisis as quickly and with little pain 
as possible, Korea accepted almost all the IMF-mandated prescriptions 
and added on top of them voluntary ones to attract investors from the 
international financial markets. Mandatory appointment of outside 
directors on the corporate boards is one of such efforts. In an 
economy known for decades for its effective state leadership, 
family-controlled huge business groups called chaebol, and their heavy 
reliance on bank credit rather than direct financing, the concept of 
outside directors was hardly known before the crisis. To borrow 
Fligstein’s term (1990), outside directorship does not mix well with the 
‘conception of control’ prevalent in the Korean economy. The Asian 
crisis, however, suddenly changed the business climate. Chaebol 
business groups were criticized for their ‘emperor management,’ which 
means the group chairman makes all the important decisions without 
consulting anyone. Boards of directors are typically powerless because 
directors are appointed and dismissed at whim by the group 
chairman. In this new climate, outside directors began to be seen as 
an attractive alternative that can monitor the emperor management. 
Once surfaced from under the water, the idea spread very quickly and 
mandatory appointment of outside directors was finally included in 
the letter of intent the Korean government submitted to the IMF.
However, it seems that institutions are not so easily transplanted. If 
outside directors as a monitoring device has evolved out of the 
Western experiences ― largely American and British ― where capital 
market-based direct financing is predominant, its transplantation to the 
East Asian context must have generated some modifications. The 
Korean economy has come to have all the problems ― if they are 
problems ― pointed out as the causes of the Asian crisis as a 
consequence of the growth trajectory it has followed for the past half 
century. History cannot be undone. Since the new institutional 
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requirement of outside director appointment is mandatory, it cannot 
be undone, either. If neither can be undone, there must be some 
modification that makes them live peacefully together. This paper 
attempts to delineate the logic of outside director selection in Korea 
by closely examining data on outside director network of financial 
institutions in 1999-2000. 
FINDINGS, CONSENSUS, AND DEBATES SURROUNDING 
OUTSIDE- AND INTERLOCKING DIRECTORS IN THE WEST
In the existing literature, the borderline between outside- and 
interlocking directors is less than perfectly clear. Interlocking directors 
are a subcategory of outside directors from the point of view of the 
recipient firm. Conceptually one can apply stricter definition for 
interlocking directors as ‘people who work as directors in both the 
dispatching and the receiving firms,’ while outside directors can be 
either directors or not in the dispatching organization as long as they 
sit on the receiving firm’s board. However, despite the conceptual 
distinction, the borderline can often be blurred in both academic 
research and real life. For example, in his review on interlock 
research, Mizruchi begins with a definition such as, “an interlocking 
directorate occurs when a person affiliated with one organization sits 
on the board of directors of another organization” (1996: 271). In this 
definition of an interlocking directorate, there is no such strict 
requirement that the person has to sit on both boards. Rather, all it 
requires is that the person is ‘affiliated’ with the dispatching 
organization. In fact, there is no reason to insist on this strict 
definition of an interlocking director because the whole idea about the 
phenomenon started from the observation that it might signal a 
cooperative strategy between economic organizations for reducing 
uncertainty in their environments (Allen, 1974). People do not have to 
be directors to function as a liaison between multiple organizations 
and thereby reduce uncertainty. Furthermore, it is often practically 
impossible to distinguish between interlocking- and outside directors 
in the empirical data. In the annual reports of Korean firms, for 
example, most firms simply state that a specific person is an ‘outside 
director,’ or a ‘non-full-time director’ together with the person’s 
primary organizational affiliation, without specifying whether s/he sits 
on the board of the sending organization. For these reasons, I will 
treat outside directors and interlocking directors as two different 
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words for basically a same phenomenon in this paper.
Although it is neither a logical necessity nor a practical possibility 
to distinguish between the two, one finds a substantial gap in the 
respective research tradition dealing with one or the other. In the 
outside director research tradition, new institutional economics 
perspective, especially agency theory, has been dominant. In his 
classical formulation of the agency problem, Fama states that “[outside 
directors] might best be regarded as professional referees whose task 
is to stimulate and oversee the competition among the firm’s top 
managers. In a state of advanced evolution of the external markets 
that buttress the corporate firm, the outside directors are in their turn 
disciplined by the market for their services which prices them 
according to their performance as referees” (Fama, 1980: 293-4). As 
obvious from this statement, agency-theoretic formulation of the 
outside directorate requires a few important assumptions about the 
corporate environment. First, it requires a substantial degree of 
separation of ownership and control, the ideal type of which is a Berle 
and Means-type firm. Second, common to all fields of new 
institutional economics, it requires a reasonably well-functioning 
market to ensure outside directors live up to their responsibilities.1
Empirical research along this tradition has produced numerous 
findings. Some of the representative results include the following. 
Outside director appointments generate significantly positive 
share-price reaction, confirming that the events are in the interest of 
shareholders rather than the incumbent management, a finding 
consistent across different occupations of the appointee (Rosenstein 
and Wyatt, 1990). Outside directors are more likely to join the board 
after a firm performs poorly (perhaps to strengthen the monitoring 
device), while inside directors are more likely to leave (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1988). Adding outside directors to the corporate board has 
some positive, though lagged, effects on profit, with decreasing 
marginal returns (Baysinger and Butler, 1985). An important 
commonality in these findings is that they see the firm as a nexus of 
conflicting interests, especially between the management and the 
shareholders, thereby anticipating a positive relationship between 
outside director monitoring and firm performance.
1 Williamson explicitly admits that: transactions const economics relies on the 
assumption of the existence of market competition; this reliance narrows the scope of 
transaction cost economics; and there is the need for constructing a broader theoretical 
framework of which his contribution is a part (1985: 22-3; 1988: 174).
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Things are a little different following the director interlock research 
tradition. Rather than the potential conflict of interest between the 
management and the shareholders, what matters here is the 
relationship between organizations, between organizations and their 
environments, or between social classes. Firms are often implicitly 
assumed as coherent bodies with harmonized interests. According to 
Mizruchi’s review (1996), there are at least five identifiable lines of 
explanations forthe interlocking directorates, four of which are of 
interest in this paper. First, there is collusion theory. The positive 
relationship between director interlocks and industry concentration 
found in existing research (Pennings, 1980; Burt, 1983) suggests that 
the incentive to collude might be the primary motive for firms to 
interlock. But these findings should be interpreted with caution 
because the evidence for the positive association between director 
interlock and firm profitability is not so well established. Second, there 
is monitoring/cooptation theory. Drawing on Selznick’s formulation of 
the concept of cooptation (1949), many researchers have attempted to 
establish the link between resource dependence and director interlocks, 
with fair deal of success (e.g., Pfeffer, 1972). However, what is not so 
clear here is whether firms “invite” or “dispatch” directors. If firms 
invite directors, it means that resource-dependent firms try at 
cooptation by inviting directors from the firms on which they depend. 
If the latter is the case, firms dispatch directors to the boards of other 
firms to which they extend favor in order to monitor the reliant firms' 
management. Both directions can hold depending on the concrete 
situation. Both collusion theory and monitoring/cooptation theory 
operate at the organizational level of analysis.
The third explanation, at the class level of analysis, is social 
cohesion theory. Because most interlocking directors come from 
positions high in the corporate ladder, it seems self-evident that the 
phenomenon can be interpreted as a league of their own where 
‘everyone washes everyone else’s hands’ (Mills, 1956). It might be 
possible that interlocking directorates serve to collectively represent the 
class interest of people so prominent as to sit on multiple corporate 
boards, to form an ‘inner circle,’ and to solidify the gap between them 
and the rest of the society (Useem, 1984). 
Finally, there is legitimacy explanation operating at the individual 
level of analysis. According to this explanation, interlocking directors 
affiliated with prestigious organizations are invited to sit on the board 
for the inviting firm’s incentive to send a positive signal to potential 
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investors in the capital market. Instead of the conflict of interest 
between the management under scrutiny and the interlocking directors 
who eventually get evaluated by the market, mutual benefit is much 
more emphasized in this explanation. Both the inviting firm and the 
invited directors benefit from their joining.2
Combining the questions and issues raised by the research traditions 
discussed so far, one can come up with a few interesting questions 
that will help us explore the transplantation of outside directorship 
into Korean markets.
Q1. Correlates: What is the relationshipbetween outside director 
appointment and firm performance? Is there a systematic relationship? 
If so, in terms of what performance measure does the appointment of 
outside directors affect firm performance? Other than performance, 
what other variables are associated with outside director appointment? 
Q2. Causal Direction: What is the causal direction regarding outside 
director appointment? Do firms invite or dispatch directors? In other 
words, is it cooptation or monitoring? Is this one-or-the-other type of 
question, or is there possibility that both dynamics are present 
simultaneously? In case both work simultaneously, what are the 
factors that determine which is more important?
Q3. Unit of Analysis: Is it organizations, individuals, or social 
classes that really matters? In other words, is it firms, prominent 
individuals, or classes that count most in the power structure of 
Korean business as measured by outside director appointments?
Q4. Types of Environment: Is it technical/competitive or institutional/ 
legitimacy environment that firms primarily consider when appointing 
outside directors? Are these appointments driven by pursuit of profit 
or legitimacy concerns? Like the other three questions, this question is 
fundamentally related to the true nature of the post-crisis situation in 
Korea. Were Korean firms primarily driven by profit motives because 
they were trapped in liquidity problems and credit-crunch, or was 
there still room for legitimacy concerns even in the middle of crisis 
situation?
2 One explanation Mizruchi mentioned but is not included in this paper is career 
advancement model. I decided not to include it in this paper because the data I use 
does not have longitudinal biographical information on the outside directors. To test 
this theory, one would need longitudinal data both before and after the appointment to 
see if there was career advancement.
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DATA
The data for the current analysis comes from annual reports of 
Korean financial institutions available from the DART system (Data 
Analysis, Retrieval, and Transfer System) providedby Korean Financial 
Supervisory Service. Firms that are listed, subject to external audit, or 
registered with the FSS are mandated by law to submit their annual 
reports electronically, which are made available to the general public 
through the DART system. 
Of the many firms for which data is available through this system, I 
have decided to restrict the boundaryto financial institutions. The 
decision was made because of the unique theoretical as well as 
empirical position financial institutions have occupied in the director 
interlock research tradition. Empirically, most existing research has 
found banks to be central in the American intercorporate network 
(Kotz, 1978; Mintz and Schwartz, 1985). However, this empirical 
finding once seemed established has recently been shaken by a 
contrary result by Davis and Muzruchi (1999) that banks have been 
losing centrality because of technological advances and regulatory 
changes that have opened up attractive alternatives of corporate 
financing and household savings. How central banks are in the 
director network that is newly being formed in Korea is an 
empirically intriguing question. Theoretically, there are reasons why 
banks and/or other forms of financial institutions to be central or 
peripheral. Banks are expected to be central because their business is 
to control money supply to firms, whether they use this positional 
power overtly (financial hegemony) or covertly (financial power). But 
the degree of bank centrality is likely to be affected by business cycle 
and major changes in the capital market like merger waves since the 
part of money supplythat is most easily controlled by banks is quick 
money usually needed in times of business downturn or huge mergers 
(Stearns, 1986). In addition, like noted above, technological advances 
and introduction of new financial products might lower bank 
centrality because the origin and destination of money flow can be 
more varied than before. If so, there are theoretical reasons both to 
believe and not to believe Korean banks should be central. It is 
needless to point out that Korean business was in downturn right 
after the huge crisis of 1997/98. There was a merger wave, probably 
for the first time in Korea, which took off around the end of 1997 and 
landed in 2000 (Han and Chang, 2003). These observations encourage 
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one to believe that Korean banks should be highly central. But it is 
also commonsensical that Korean banks have been under the tight grip 
of the government, which means banks might not have had a chance 
to put their leverage into actual use and thus discourages the belief. In 
any case, it is clear that banks and financial institutions are the place 
from which research on outside director network should get started.
Another concern is the time period for which the data is to be 
compiled. Since I wanted to allow some minimum amount of time for 
the new dynamics of outside director appointment to settle down, I 
decided to give a one-year term after the revision of the law in 1998. 
Thus, the exact time point should be some time in 1999. However, 
listed companies in the Korean market can choose among March, June, 
September and December to submit their annual report, which means 
that it is not possible to collect data for multiple firms exactly for the 
same date. As a result, data were compiled as of September or 
December 1999 for some firms and March or June 2000 for some other 
firms. However, the consistent principle is to compile data from the 
first annual report submitted after allowing a one-year term after the 
revision of the law. 
Figure 1 shows the outside director network of Korean financial 
institutions in 1999-2000. After examining the preliminary results, two 
financial institutions and those organizations linked only with these 
            whole network                          largest component
FIGURE 1. OUTSIDE DIRECTOR NETWORK OF KOREAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
WHOLE NETWORK AND LARGEST COMPONENT
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two institutions are deleted before generating Figure 1. The deleted 
institutions are Shinhan Bank and Shinhan Securities. A strong 
Korean-Japanese presence in the Korean financial market, Shinhan 
maintains an idiosyncratic outside director network in terms of both 
size and the identity of connected firms. Combined, these two 
financial institutions bring in 35 mostly Japan-based organizations such 
as Korean-Japanese Association for Investment in Korea and Korean-Japanese 
Chamber of Commerce. Considering that the 117 financial institutions 
retrieved from the DART system have on average 3.88 outside 
directors, the combined network size of 35 is almost five times as 
many as a typical firm in the data set. Given this, I have decided to 
delete Shinhan and related organizations for three reasons. First, 
statistically, it brings in extreme skew in the distribution of many 
variables. Second, network-analytically, its idiosyncrasy conceals 
important differences among the other 115 organizations. Third, 
theoretically, there is reason to believe that Shinhan comes from a very 
different population from the one the other firms are drawn from. 
After deleting Shinhan and related nodes, the whole network in 
Figure 1 contains 380 nodes, 115 of which are focal firms (i.e., 
financial institutions). In contrast, the largest component in the same 
figure has 250 nodes 68 of which are focal firms. Table 1 provides a 
comparison of some basic characteristics of these two networks.
The two networks summarized in Table 1 do not show much 
difference but in one characteristic. They have similar density, similar 
percentage of isolates (72.6% indegree for whole network and 72.4% 
TABLE 1. BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WHOLE NETWORK AND THE LARGEST 
COMPONENT
Whole network Largest component
Number of nodes 380 250
Number of focal nodes 115 68
Number of links 357 267
Network density .003 .004
Number of isolates 276 indegree; 88 outdegree 182 indegree; 44 outdegree
Number of bridges 290 200
Mean geodesic distance 378.4 (S.D.=24.43) 247.98 (S.D.=22.08)
Number of strong components 0 0
Number of weak components 30 1
Number of cliques 3 3
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indegree for largest component; 23.2% outdegree for whole network 
and 17.6% outdegree for largest component) and similar number of 
bridges compared to the number of existing links (81.2% for whole 
network and 74.9% for largest component). Both have none strong 
component and three cliques. The big difference comes from the 
number of weak components. In network-analytic terms, a component 
captures connectedness in a graph. More specifically, a component is a 
maximal connected subgraph, which means it cannot be made larger 
without losing its property of having a path between each of the 
members of it. Nodes that are not members of the component are 
disconnected from those in the component. A strong component 
requires reciprocal ties while a tie in either direction satisfies the 
definition of a weak component. Since outside director network is 
expected to be asymmetrical by nature, I focus on weak components. 
What is interesting about the 30 weak components in the whole 
network is, setting aside the huge component with 250 members, all 
the other components are very small with an average size of only 
4.48. 
This result strongly suggests that at least two qualitatively different 
classes of financial institutions are co-existent in the whole network. 
One class is those connected with the center, no matter how far the 
path distance is. The other class is those detached from the center. 
Since what we are considering here is weak components, 
‘connectedness’ means either, in some sense, influencing, or being 
influenced by, the center. That a financial institution is 'disconnected' 
means that it has no path to or from the center. In other words, it 
cannot, no matter how remotely, influence the center, and the center 
does not want to influence it. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that 
the 29 small components are homogenous among themselves. This 
suggests that the members of the whole network are very likely to be 
highly heterogeneous. In fact, this heterogeneity could be expected 
from the nature of the data because financial institutions incorporate 
very different firms ranging from small mutual credit companies 
operating on a regional basis to huge nationwide commercial banks. 
For these reasons, I once again narrow down the scope of data to be 
analyzed to the members of the largest weak component. In fact, 
further preliminary analyses revealed that, of the 68 focal firms in the 
largest weak component, three firms have unexplainable extreme 
values for some variables, further reducing the number of cases to 65.
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ANALYSIS 
Who’s at the Center? The Center-Periphery Structure
The usual interest in the interlocking directorate research tradition 
has lied in identifying who is at the center of the power structure 
represented by the network data. However, the center-periphery 
structure can be identified differently depending upon the direction of 
ties the researcher is primarily interested in. If cooptation is the major 
theoretical motive, then firms with many incoming ties are the 
significant players, while those with many outgoing ties represent the 
locus of power if monitoring seems the prevalent mechanism. Figure 2 
shows the distribution of indegree- and outdegree centrality values. As 
obvious from the skewness of the distribution (2.390 skewness and 
.154 standard error for indegree centrality; 2.195 skewness and .154 
standard error for outdegree centrality), both curves are L-shaped, 
indicating the presence of a center-periphery structure. Table 2 gives 
the roster of firms with centrality scores above and beyond 90th 
percentile, together with their organization types and degree centrality 
scores.
Banks and securities companies are at the center of the outside 
director network made up of incoming ties. Although at first glance 
the centrality of these types of financial institutions may seem 
somewhat consistent with existing research on the American business, 
it is in fact exactly the opposite when considering the direction of ties. 
While American banks dispatch the most number of directors to other 












FIGURE 2. HISTOGRAM OF INDEGREE AND OUTDEGREE CENTRALITY SCORES
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Because it seems unlikely that the center-location in the incoming tie 
structure bestows power, there should be an explanation other than 
power or hegemony. One that most naturally comes to mind is the 
heightened need for cooptation or legitimacy these firms might have. 
In fact, banks have been at the core of the chaebol restructuring 
program named “Bank-Centered Corporate Restructuring” while at the 
same time they have been the target of another reform program called 
“Financial Restructuring Program.”3 It is possible that this situation 
has rendered banks to feel more need for cooptation and legitimacy 
that they might have thought can meet by inviting more outside 
directors.
TABLE 2. ROSTER OF ORGANIZATIONS ABOVE 90TH PERCENTILE IN CENTRALITY 
SCORES
3 See Chang Sea-Jin (2003) for details of Bank-centered Corporate Restructuring and 
Financial Restructuring.
Indegree Centrality Outdegree Centrality
Name Type Score Name Type of Org. Score
Korea Housing &
Commercial Bank Bank 13 Korea University University 7
Good Morning Securities Securities 10 Seoul National University University 5
KTB Network Venture Capital 10 Sinyoung Securities Securities 4
Hana Bank Bank 10 Korea Exchange Bank Bank 4
Korea Exchange Bank Bank 9 Inha University University 4
Kwangju Bank Bank (Regional) 8 Chohung Bank Bank 4
Peace Bank of Korea Bank 8 Chungang University University 4




Kumho Merchant Bank Merchant Bank 7
Chonbuk Bank Bank (Regional) 7
Hana Securities Securities 7
Hanbit Bank Bank 7
Hyundai Investment Trust 
& Securities Securities 7
Taegu Bank Bank(Regional) 6
Samsung Securities Securities 6
Seoul Securities Securities 6
Korea First Bank Bank 6
Chohung Bank Bank 6
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Another interesting finding from Table 2 is the importance of 
universities. Of the eight organizations that dispatched four or more of 
their employees to the board of directors of the 65 financial 
institutions in the dataset, four are universities. As discussed earlier, 
this position has traditionally been occupied by money-center banks in 
the United States, though with some recent decline. However, it is the 
universities ― especially, those most prestigious ones ― that are most 
central in the network of outgoing directors in the Korean financial 
market. What does this finding signify? One plausible explanation is 
cooptation, rather than monitoring, is the key to understanding the 
dynamics of outside director network newly forming in Korea. 
Outside directors in my dataset are from just a few walks-of-life. They 
are executives of business organizations (regardless of distinctions such 
as domestic vs. foreign, business group vs. independent, nationwide 
vs. local, and real vs. financial sector), high-rank officers of 
government ministries or bureaus, professionals such as lawyers, or 
university professors. Of these select groups of people, university 
professors are the only group of outside directors who seldom attempt 
to represent the interests of the dispatching organization. Although 
employed full-time at universities, their job is basically individualistic. 
This characteristic can give the inviting firm much relief in the sense 
that they will not be closely monitored by another organization. In 
addition, professors, especially those from prestigious universities, 
bring with them a great deal of legitimacy to the inviting firm. These 
observations provide the basis for concluding that cooptation is a 
much more important engine than monitoring in the Korean outside 
director network. Combining the two findings ― banks at the center 
of the incoming network and universities at the center of the outgoing 
network-, one might reach a partial answer to some of the research 
questions raised in the previous section. In terms of causal direction, 
invitation rather than dispatch ― thus, cooptation rather than 
monitoring  seems to be at work. Also, it is likely that legitimacy 
concern seems also in effect.
CORRELATES OF OUTSIDE DIRECTOR CENTRALITY
One of the important concerns in both outside director research in 
new institutional economics and director interlock research in 
sociology is to identify the correlates of centrality. The bivariate 
correlation matrix containing all the nine variables used in the analysis 
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is shown in Table 3. Each of the nine variables represents a different 
aspect of the financial institutions in the dataset. How many outside 
directors a financial institution appoints is of course the variable of 
primary concern. Since it is well-documented that business group form 
is a significant way businesses are organized in Korea, I wanted to 
include a variable that measures how deeply a financial institution is 
embedded in this form. Number of affiliated companies is the 
variable. The more deeply a financial institution is embedded in the 
business group form, the more affiliated companies it is likely to have. 
Concentration of ownership in the hands of the owner's family is 
known as another significant characteristic of Korean business, which 
is measured by the percent of family ownership. ROA is a standard 
measure of performance. Securities-to-deposit ratio shows how much 
risk a financial institution is taking in its day to day business. Unlike 
loans for which the expected yield is known, securities investment is 
much riskier because of the possible fluctuation of the securities price 
in the future. Percent of NPL  (non-performing loans) gives the degree 
of urgency a financial institution is facing because of its bad decisions 
TABLE 3. CORRELATION MATRIX OF VARIABLES USED IN ANALYSIS
* p<.05 ** p<.01
All variables but securities-to-deposit ratio, % NPL, and ROA are logged.
ROA is squared after adding a constant to correct for negative skew.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. # outside directors
2. # affiliated companies
.346**
(.005)
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in the past. Asset size is of course a standard size variable. PBR 
(price-to-book ratio) measures how favorably the market is evaluating 
the company. A PBR value higher than 1 means the market sees the 
business as more valuable than its book value. Stock price fluctuation 
is calculated by dividing the highest stock price in the past one month 
with the lowest price in the same period. It gives the degree of 
market uncertainty a financial institution operates in. Thus, we have 
variables representing business group embeddedness, family 
ownership, performance, risk-taking, urgency, size, market evaluation, 
and uncertainty in addition to the number of outside directors. The 
number of cases is 65 for all variables but securities-to-deposit ratio 
(22), percent of NPL (30), PBR (60), and stock price fluctuation (60).
How many outside directors a financial institution appoints is 
positively correlated with number of affiliated companies, 
securities-to-deposit ratio, and asset size. It is negatively correlated 
with percent of family shares and stock price fluctuation. Financial 
institutions heavily embedded in the business group tend to be bigger 
and show lower ROA. The negative association between the number 
of affiliated companies and performance is consistent with the usual 
criticism that financial institutions belonging to a business group are 
exploited to function as the money pipeline for the group. Family 
ownership seems to significantly harm financial institutions. It has 
strong negative effect on market evaluation. Also, financial institutions 
with high proportion of family shares tend to have made many bad 
decisions as demonstrated by higher NPL, encounter higher market 
uncertainty, and shut down the links to the outside world by having 
fewer outside directors. ROA is negatively correlated with size but 
positively with market evaluation. Firms that take more risk tend to 
be bigger and have more outside directors. Bad decisions measured by 
the percent of NPL are less frequently made in bigger firms and are 
positively associated with uncertainty. Again, financial institutions that 
are favorably evaluated in the market face significantly lower 
uncertainty.
PREDICTING OUTSIDE DIRECTOR CENTRALITY
So far we have examined the correlates of outside director centrality. 
However, these are bivariate correlations without controlling for other 
variables. In the real world factors affecting outside director centrality 
mix with one another and operate at the same time. To capture this 
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TABLE 4. OLS REGRESSION OF OUTSIDE DIRECTOR CENTRALITY
*p<.05 ** p<.01
Table entries are standardized coefficients. P-values are in parentheses.
real world dynamics, regression analysis models are built. Since the 
number of cases is quite limited to only 65 at the largest, we do not 
want to have too many independent variables. Table 4 summarizes the 
OLS results.
Of the nine variables in Table 4, outside director centrality is used 
as the dependent variable. Of the remaining eight variables, 
securities-to-deposit ratio and percent of NPL were not used because 
including these two variables lowers the number of cases as low as 
22. Both PBR and stock price fluctuation capture some aspect of the 
firm's position in the stock market. Although the low and insignificant 
correlation between these two variables makes it tempting to include 
both in the regression model, the small number of cases discourages 
it. Several experiments with these two variables demonstrated that 
these two variables had almost identical effect on the regression 
model. Substituting stock price fluctuation for PBR gives slightly 
higher R2 of .526. Standardized coefficients and p-values remain 
basically the same. Given this result, I decided to use PBR because 
this is a better-known standard variable. 
Model 1 through 3 show that business group embeddedness 
increases, and family ownership decreases, outside director centrality. 
Performance as measured by ROA has no significant effect. It is 
somewhat hard to understand why business group embeddedness 
increases the number of outside directors appointed. Because business 




































R2 .120 .238 .243 .506 .518
F 8.562** 9.680** 6.517** 15.336** 11.587**
TRANSPLANTING OUTSIDE DIRECTORS 165
group is not a legal entity, firms belonging to a same business group 
have independent legal statusas separate entities. Thus, directors 
coming from other member firms are technically counted as outside 
directors, which might be the only reason why business group 
embeddedness increases outside director centrality. However, there are 
reasons to believe that business group embeddedness itself should not 
have this effect. Since business group firms are already tightly 
controlled by the group chairman via complex web of equity ties, 
there is no additional need to monitor member firms by means of 
outside directors. Business groups already have a huge pool of 
resources and information processing facilities that can easily 
outperform the benefits individual outside directors can bring, which 
is another reason why business groups might feel less need to appoint 
more outside directors. The lack of significant association between 
ROA and centrality can also be a puzzle, depending on the 
researcher's theoretical expectation. If the researcher follows 
agency-theoretic or collusion/cooptation perspectives, there should be a 
positive relationship. If it is legitimacy theory the analysis is primarily 
driven by, there should not necessarily be an association.
Model 4 solves the business group puzzle. Once the firm size is 
controlled for, business group embeddedness suddenly becomes 
insignificant with much smaller coefficient. Since firms belonging to a 
business group is generally significantly bigger than independent 
firms, it seems that much of the business group effect observed in 
Model 1 through 3 came from the size difference. When size is 
controlled for, it is noticeable that the effect of ROA comes close to 
the conventional level of statistical significance. The value was .538 in 
Model 3 but suddenly flattens to .075 in Model 4. Recall that ROA 
was negatively correlated with both business group embeddedness 
and size in Table 3. That is to say, bigger firms, many of which are 
business group firms, tend to have more outside directors and at the 
same time perform poorly. This situation conceals the net effect of 
ROA in Model 3. But once both business group effect and size are 
controlled for, the net positive effect of ROA begins to reveal itself.
Model 5 has PBR added on top of Model 4. Since this variable  
market evaluation of the financial institution's value  is not statistically 
significant with the net additional variance explained being only 1.2% 
(R2 from .506 to .518), basically it does little to enhance the model. 
What it does is to change the close-to-significant effect of ROA clearly 
significant with p-value of .046. Although the volume of change it 
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brings is small, the direction of the change can be instantly 
understood because ROA and PBR are two more-or-less overlapping 
measures of firm performance. Although ROA reflects the firm’s 
profitability and PBR the market evaluation, they are fundamentally 
connected with each other. 
Yet another finding that is consistently observed in the regression 
analyses in Table 4 is family ownership lowers outside director 
centrality. From the correlations in Table 3 we already know that 
family control is poisonous in many respects. It increases percent of 
NPL and market uncertainty while at the same time makes the firm 
unfavorably evaluated by the market. Also, it decreases the number of 
outside directors. If outside directors do any good for the firm, family 
ownership deprives the firm of the benefit. All the signals 
surrounding family ownership point to the same direction. High 
percent of shares owned by the family, combined with the Korean 
culture of familism, often encourages heavy involvement of family 
members in the everyday management of the firm. Since there is no 
guarantee that the human capital of these family members is as good 
as those of competition-washed professional managers, it is likely that 
they more often make bad decisions, increasing the percent of NPL. 
This trait of a family-controlled firm shouldof course be unfavorably 
evaluated by the market, lowering the PBR. The familist culture as 
well as the lack of available slots due to the many number of family 
members already sitting on important positions make it difficult to 
invite talented directors from outside.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS
Now it is time to step back a little and think about the answers 
these findings might suggest to the research questions raised in 
Section II. We have seen three groups of findings from the analysis of 
outside director network data of Korean financial institutions in 
1999-2000. The first group of findings concerns the center-periphery 
structure of this outside director network. Unlike the established 
finding of “bank centrality” from the American data, it is not banks 
but universities that are at the heart of outside director dispatch 
network in the Korean data. Banks are at the center of outside 
director invitation network. To the extent that organizations that 
dispatch many of their employees to other organizations tend to have 
power while those receive many from others become vulnerable to 
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external influence, there is in fact “bank marginality” rather than 
“bank centrality” in the Korean outside director network that is being 
formed since 1998. 
It is also noteworthy that it is universities that are at the center of 
director dispatch network. Most of the organizations that appear in 
the dataset are highly visible and powerful ones such as financial 
institutions, government bureaus, and law firms. Neither financial 
institutions with their technicality and instant understanding of what 
is happening in the recipient institution, nor government bureaus with 
their regulatory power, nor law firms with their legal expertise are at 
the center. Universities, compared to these other types of candidates, 
usually do not have more technical competency or power. There are 
two major differences universities have from other organizations. One 
is, they are highly legitimate organizations. The other is, the work of 
university professors is very individualistic despite their full-time 
affiliation with the organization. Combined, the “university centrality” 
observed in the Korean data seems to indicate that the inviting 
organizations want to have people who will bring high legitimacy but 
won’t attempt to exercise organized influence. These results suggest 
that cooptation, rather than monitoring or collusion, is at work in the 
Korean financial market. If monitoring is the main engine, it should 
be organizations with technical competency or regulatory power that 
occupy the center position. If it is collusion, there should be an inner 
circle composed of prestigious financial institutions. 
The second group of findings shows what variables move together 
withoutside director centrality. Business group embeddedness, 
risk-taking, and size are positively correlated with having many 
directors from outside. Family ownership and uncertainty are 
negatively so. Performance, urgency as measured by percent of NPL, 
and market evaluation do not have significant bivariate correlation 
with the number of outside directors. Some of these bivariate 
correlations  especially risk-taking and uncertainty are consistent with 
the cooptation story derived from the first group of findings. Financial 
institutions well-connected to the outside world face less uncertainty 
from the environment and thus can take more risks. However, some 
of the other correlations are ambiguous. The effect of business group 
embeddedness is already explained. If cooptation is the primary 
engine at work, why is there no significant association between 
outside director centrality on the one hand and performance, urgency, 
and market evaluation on the other?
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Some of the answers to these ambiguities are given in the third 
group of findings. After controlling for the effects of other variables, 
business group embeddedness loses significance, while performance 
gets to have a positive relationship with centrality. Bigger firms with 
more resource and higher visibility tend to appoint more outside 
directors, while family ownership discourages it. Market evaluation 
still seems a puzzle. It is not only that the coefficient is statistically 
insignificant, the sign of the coefficient is contrary to what one would 
theoretically expect. Since the size of the effect is negligibly small ― 
.027 standard deviation decrease in the number of outside directors 
when there is one standard deviation increase in PBR ― , it would 
make more sense to say PBR does nothing to affect centrality even if 
the coefficient is statistically significant. Interpreted this way, the lack 
of association between PBR and outside director centrality might be 
seen to support the argument that monitoring is not the primary 
driver of what has happened in the Korean financial market since 
1998. According to the agency theory frequently followed in the new 
institutional economics research tradition, firms well-monitored should 
have favorable response from the market, and thus the positive 
association between these two variables. The lack of such a positive 
association signifies that monitoring is not a strong force.
Going back to the four research questions identified from the 
existing literature, we can think of what answers these findings have 
to those questions. The first question was the correlates outside 
director centrality. The regression analysis shows that family 
ownership, performance and size are the important determinants. 
Although they could not be included in the regression model because 
of data size considerations, the bivariate correlations show that 
risk-taking and uncertainty are also systematically associated with 
outside director centrality. The second question was about the causal 
direction. The analyses uniformly suggest that it is cooptation, rather 
than monitoring or collusion, that is primarily at work. This finding 
has some important implications considering the rationale behind the 
introduction of outside directors into the Korean market. The stated 
rationale was, of course, to facilitate management transparency and 
better corporate governance. However, the results suggest that 
monitoring purpose is not being well taken care of although the 
formal requirement is being met. 
The third question concerns the proper unit of analysis. It is not 
possible to clearly delineate the role of social classes with the given 
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type of data. However, the results seem to suggest some answers 
regarding the choice between organization versus individual level of 
analysis. The fact that academics are favored by the inviting firms and 
the systematic relationship among the groups of variables examined 
seem to suggest that the proper level of analysis for the Korean 
outside director network is organizations rather than individuals. If 
individuals are the proper unit of analysis, we should have been able 
to observe some powerful individuals who sit on three or more 
boards at the same time, which was not the case.
Finally, there is the question about the type of environment. The 
answer is both technical and institutional environments are important. 
The association that variables representing technical environment  risk, 
uncertainty, and performance  have with outside director centrality 
suggests that this type of environment cannot be ignored. In 
additionto this, some of the variables can be considered to be closely 
intertwined with the institutional environment. Number of affiliated 
companies represents the form of business organizations commonly 
found in Korea. The consistently negative effect of family ownership 
on centrality strongly suggests that not only technical but institutional 
environment is important. Also, the fact that universities  
organizations that are primarily legitimate rather than technically 
competitive  are at the center once again confirms the argument that 
both technical and institutional environments are to be taken into 
consideration for a proper understanding of the formation of outside 
director network in the Korean financial institutions.  Moreover, the 
findings from the current analysis provide a chance to balance the 
dialogue regarding the outside director selection mechanism if 
combined with an existing research. In an existing research, Lee and 
Oh (2003) used Poisson regression of 323 listed manufacturing firms to 
find out that proximity to world society and visibility rendered firms 
more vulnerable to the normative pressure to appoint a larger number 
of outside directors. Although there are some differences in the 
research setting in the sense that Lee and Oh’s deals with 
manufacturing firms rather than financial institutions, theirs and the 
current analysis are at least partially comparable. Lee and Oh’s work 
almost exclusively relied on variables representing institutional 
environment, although they controlled for the percent of equity held 
by small shareholders with less than 1% and the changes in revenue, 
to find out institutional environment is critical in determining the 
number of outside directors. However, the current analysis recovers 
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the balance by the findings that many aspects of the technical/ 
competitive environment are systematically related to the centrality of 
firms in the outside director network. 
A few last words are due before closing. There have been many 
institutional changes and introduction of new institutions in the 
Korean business since the Asian crisis abruptly dismantled the old 
system. Mandatory appointment of outside directors for publicly 
traded firms is one of such new institutions. The dominant discourse 
right after the crisis was that the crisis-hit countries had been doomed 
for such a failure because they did not follow the global standard. In 
this discourse, the high-growth track record of the crisis-hit countries 
was completely forgotten. New institutions were introduced in a 
hastened manner to ‘cure’ the causes of the crisis. And most of the 
newly introduced institutional requirements are now firmly in place, 
in the sense that the requirements are being met. However, this does 
not guarantee that the new rules are doing what they were originally 
supposed to do. The analysis of outside director network in the 
Korean financial market strongly suggests that institutions are 
modified and transformed as they are transplanted in a different 
context.
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